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The Role of "De Minimis" Injury in the Excessive Force 
Determination: Taylor v. McDuffie and the Fourth Circuit 
Stand Alone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States occupies a unique position with regard to those 
who are suspected of having committed a crime or who have actually 
been convicted and incarcerated. On one hand, there is an obvious need 
to punish those who have committed crimes; yet, on the other, the Con-
stitution affords both suspected and convicted criminals such basic pro-
tections as the right "against unreasonable searches and seizures,"1 the 
right to "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,"2 and the right to 
be free from "cruel and unusual punishments."3 
While not every push or shove inflicted on an inmate or pretrial de-
tainee amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, there is a fine line to be 
drawn between the amount of force necessary to maintain order in an in-
stitutional setting and force so excessive that it amounts to punishment. 
Likewise, there must be a balance between protecting the constitutional 
rights of inmates or pretrial detainees, and furnishing the security that the 
corrections officers or police officers must provide while the inmate or 
detainee is in custody, especially during a disturbance. One court has 
held, "[ w ]hether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, 
corrections officers must balance the need 'to maintain or restore disci-
pline' through force against the risk of injury to inmates."4 Furthermore, 
'"[t]he management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners, not 
usually the most gentle or tractable of men and women,' accurately de-
picts the tensions inherent in custodial settings, be they pre-trial or post-
conviction."5 
Copyright© 2000 by Troy J. Aramburu. 
I. U.S. Const. amend IV. 
2. U.S. Const. amend VI. 
3. U.S. Const. amend VIII. 
4. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
321-22 (1986)). 
5. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (quoting Johnson v. 
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)). 
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The Eighth Amendment provides that prisoners and pretrial detain-
ees will be protected against "cruel and unusual punishment,"6 while the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes that pris-
oners and pretrial detainees can bring claims for excessive force that 
amount to "punishment."7 Further, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides a means 
by which victims of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive force can 
litigate their claims against the offending party or parties: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress .... 8 
However, the crux of most "excessive force" or "cruel and unusual 
punishment" cases boil down to whether an inmate can prove, typically 
only with his own affidavit,9 that he or she was subjected to an illegal 
amount of force for the sake of punishment. One way this has emerged in 
the case law is for the plaintiff to put on evidence as to the extent of any 
injury sustained as proof of the force used to produce the injury, 10 the ar-
gument being that if the injuries are horrific, surely the amount of force 
used to give the injury was excessive. But what if the inmate or pretrial 
detainee who is claiming he or she has been the victim of excessive force 
has only slight or de minimis injury?11 At least one court, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, 12 has held that de minimis injuries are conclusive evidence of de 
minimis force and thus no excessive force claim can stand. This is the 
issue presented in this note: should the existence of de minimis injury be 
only one factor in the determination of excessive force claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983, or should it be the conclusive 
factor? This issue stands at the heart of the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Taylor v. McDuffie. 13 
6. U.S. Const. amend VIII. 
7. See U.S. Const. amend XN; see also Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane) 
("We conclude[d] that the excessive force claims of pretrial detainees are governed by the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994) (emphasis added). 
9. See Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 1994) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
10. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I (1992). 
II. De minimis means: 'The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling 
matters. The law does not concern itself about trifles. Provision is made under certain criminal stat-
utes for dismissing offenses which are 'de minimis."' BLACK'S LAW DicriONARY 431 (6th ed. 
1990). 
12. See Taylor v. McDuffie, !55 F. 3d 479 (4th Cir. 1998). 
13. See id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Taylor stands alone among the cir-
cuit courts in holding that if a plaintiff under section 1983 can only show 
that he or she has suffered a de minimis injury, it is conclusive evidence 
that the plaintiff was subjected to de minimis rather than excessive force, 
and thus the judicial inquiry need not go further. 14 To fully understand 
the Fourth Circuit's position, it is necessary to examine the cases upon 
which the Fourth Circuit relied. 
In Hudson v. McMillian, 15 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not suffer se-
rious injury. 16 The Court held that it may. 17 The facts of Hudson maintain 
that one morning, Hudson, an inmate at a state penitentiary, and one of 
the defendants, McMillian, a corrections officer, got into an argument. 
After the argument, McMillian and several other officers handcuffed and 
shackled the inmate, took the prisoner from his cell and began walking 
him to the administrative lockdown area. 18 Hudson testified that on the 
way to the lockdown area, McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, 
around the head, and in the stomach while another officer held Hudson in 
place and kicked and hit him from behind. 19 As a result of the alleged 
beating, Hudson sustained minor bruises and swelling of his face and 
mouth, loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate.Z0 
Hudson sued the corrections officers under section 1983 alleging a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.21 The district court found for Hudson, but the Fifth Circuit, 
on appeal, held that Hudson could not prevail on his Eighth Amendment 
claim because his injuries were minor and required no medical atten-
tion.Z2 
To determine whether or not the actions allegedly perpetrated by the 
officers rise to the level of excessive force, the Supreme Court in Hudson 
sets out an "either/or" test to classify the force used. Courts must ask 
whether the force was applied (1) "in a good-faith effort to maintain or 
14. See id. at 486 (pointing out that "our circuit stands alone among all other courts of appeal 
in holding that de minimis injury, without more, is dispositive of an excessive force claim"). 
IS. 503U.S.I(I992). 
16. See id. at 4. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 5. 
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restore discipline," or (2) "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."23 
If the court finds that the force used by the officers was a "good-faith ef-
fort to maintain" discipline, the force will not be deemed to be excessive 
or to fall under cruel and unusual punishment. However, if the force was 
propagated to "maliciously and sadistically" cause harm, the victim's 
constitutional right to be free from excessive force and cruel and unusual 
punishment was violated. The extent of the injury becomes relevant be-
cause the court must decide whether the force used was in good faith or 
used to cause harm. 
The Court in Hudson held that the extent of the plaintiff's injury is 
merely a factor used in the determination of whether the prisoner has an 
excessive force claim and stated "the extent of injury suffered by an in-
mate is one factor that may suggest 'whether the use of force could plau-
sibly have been thought necessary' in a particular situation."24 Thus, the 
absence of serious injury, while relevant in determining whether or not 
excessive force had been used, is not dispositive and thus does not end 
the inquiry. 
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit had an opportunity to adopt the Supreme 
Court's reasoning from Hudson. However, instead of repeating the Hud-
son rule that evidence of de minimis injury is only one factor in the 
court's analysis of an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit adopted a 
modified Hudson rule stating that de minimis injury will be evidence of 
de minimis force. 25 
In Norman v. Taylor, 26 an inmate at the Norfolk City Jail brought a 
section 1983 action against Deputy Taylor alleging excessive force in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.27 Norman insists that while he was 
incarcerated at the city jail, Taylor first threatened to stab Norman in the 
chest with a set of cell keys, and then swung the keys at the inmate's face 
striking him once on the thumb as the inmate tried to protect himself.28 
The only evidence submitted at trial that Norman's thumb was even in-
jured was a report filed by the prison doctor in which the doctor stated 
that, in his opinion, Norman was faking an injury.29 The Fourth Circuit 
found that since the district court held that Norman did not produce any 
evidence "from which one could reasonably infer that Norman was in-
jured, if at all, in more than a de minimis way when Sergeant Taylor 
23. /d. at 7. 
24. /d. at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). 
25. See Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1262 (4th Cir. 1994). 
26. See generally id. 
27. See id. at 1260. 
28. See id. at 1260-61. 
29. See id. at 1261. 
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swung his keys at him, we conclude that any force used by Sergeant Tay-
lor was de minimis and thus could not have violated the Eighth Amend-
ment."30 
The rule that comes out of Norman is that a plaintiff cannot maintain 
a section 1983 action for the use of excessive force where the plaintiff's 
injuries are de minimis. 31 Norman interprets Hudson as holding that 
while the Eighth Amendment does not require a prisoner to prove he has 
suffered '"significant injury' at the hands of prison officials," de minimis 
uses of force "are beyond 'constitutional recognition"' as long as '"the 
use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. "'32 
Furthermore, the Norman court read Hudson as providing that while the 
Supreme Court "excepted from the Eighth Amendment only de minimis 
uses of force, it seemed to affirm by negative implication ... that de 
minimis injury can serve as conclusive evidence that de minimis force 
was used."33 
In 1997, the Fourth Circuit handed down yet another excessive force 
opinion in Riley v. Dorton?4 A pretrial detainee, Charles Riley sued a 
Henrico County detective James Dorton, asserting that Dorton had used 
excessive force against Riley while he was awaiting booking.35 Riley al-
leges that after he verbally insulted Dorton, the detective "became angry 
at Riley's insult, came over from the desk where he had been filling out 
papers, and inserted the tip of his pen a quarter of an inch into Riley's 
nose, threatening to rip it open" after which he slapped Riley across the 
face. 36 The district court granted Dorton's summary judgment motion 
stating that any injuries that Riley may have received were de minimis, 
and, therefore, conclusive proof that only de minimis force was used by 
Dorton. 37 The Fourth Circuit, following its reasoning in Norman, af-
firmed. 
The court held that Riley's excessive force claims did not fall under 
the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment since the amendment does not apply until after conviction and sen-
tencing and Riley had not been convicted or sentenced at the time of the 
incident with Dorton?8 However, the court did hold that the analysis by 
which de minimis injury proves only de minimis force applies equally to 
30. !d. at 1262. 
31. See id. 
32. !d. at 1262 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). 
33. !d. at 1262. 
34. 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997). 
35. See id. at 1160. 
36. !d. at 1161. 
37. See id. at 1160. 
38. See id. at 1166. 
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claims of excessive force brought by pretrial detainees under the Four-
teenth Amendment, thus covering the claim by Riley. 39 The Riley court 
firmly established that, at least in the Fourth Circuit, "[a]n injury need 
not be severe or permanent to be actionable under the Eighth Amend-
ment, but it must be more than de minimis. We think this same rule ap-
plies to excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees."40 
Thus, the stage was set for the Fourth Circuit's next excessive force 
case, Taylor v. McDuffie. Even though Hudson had explicitly stated "the 
extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor" in the excessive 
force determination,41 the rule in the Fourth Circuit after Norman and Ri-
ley was that the extent of injury factor was dispositive to an excessive 
force claim if the plaintiff's injury was only de minimis.42 
III. TAYLOR V. MCDUFFIE 
A. Facts 
On July 4, 1990, John R. Taylor, Jr. and his girlfriend Darsilene 
Cabbagestalk were arrested for drunk and disorderly conduct and driving 
while under the influence of alcohol, respectively. Cabbagestalk was 
taken to the State Highway Patrol Office and Taylor was transported to 
the Craven County Jail for booking and appearance before a magistrate. 
Once at the jail, Officer Ronnie Lovick, one of the defendants in the 
case, seized two identification cards from Taylor and placed them on the 
counter in the lobby of the magistrate's office. One of the cards belonged 
to Taylor and the other to Cabbagestalk.43 
During this time, at the State Highway Patrol Office, another officer 
was trying to give Cabbagestalk a breathalyzer test, to which she refused 
to cooperate. In an effort to determine Cabbagestalk's identity, the offi-
cer conducting the test telephoned Officer Lovick to see if he knew her 
name. When Officer Lovick questioned Taylor as to his girlfriend's iden-
tity, Taylor not only refused to give the officer Cabbagestalk's name, but 
snatched her identification card from the counter and stuck it in his 
mouth. A struggle ensued during which the officers forced Taylor to 
"cough up" the card.44 
39. See id. 
40. /d. at 1167 (citations omitted). 
41. 503 U.S. at 7. 
42. See Norman, 25 F.3d at 1262; Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166. 
43. See Taylor v. McDuffie, !55 F.3d 479,480-81 (4th Cir. !998). 
44. See id. at 481. 
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The amount of force used by the officers while restraining Taylor is 
the crucial point in the case, thus it is not surprising that this is the point 
of the most contention between the parties. According to Taylor, and an-
other detainee who claims to have witnessed the altercation while also 
housed at the station,45 Officer Lovick "grabbed [Taylor] by the collar, 
pointed his gun at him, and demanded that he turn over his girlfriend's 
license or he would 'blow [his] brains out."'46 Taylor still refused.47 At 
this point, Taylor alleges that Officer Lovick, joined now by the other de-
fendant in the case, Deputy Ernest McDuffie, began to repeatedly punch 
and kick him about the head and ribs.48 In particular, Taylor claims that 
Deputy McDuffie, still in an effort to retrieve the license, "placed his 
knee in the lower part of Taylor's back and at the same time grabbed 
Taylor by the head and started pulling his head backwards until his back 
popped."49 Taylor also alleges that McDuffie jabbed a small wooden ba-
ton inside his nose and mouth with sufficient force to cause his nose to 
hemorrhage and to crack a tooth.50 
The officers, on the other hand, maintain that they used the appropri-
ate amount of force that was necessary to obtain Cabbagestalk's identifi-
cation card from Taylor. 51 In fact, Lovick asserts that not only did Taylor 
swipe his girlfriend's license from the counter, but that he also grabbed a 
file blade as well. 52 When Taylor allegedly used the blade to threaten the 
officer, Lovick drew his weapon, prompting Taylor to drop the file blade 
and to stick the license in his mouth.53 The officers quickly restrained 
Taylor by placing leg irons and handcuffs on him and taking him to the 
booking area. Once in the booking area, the officers contend that Taylor 
"violently resisted" their attempts to remove the license from his 
mouth. 54 It was only then, according to the defendants, that the officers 
used the baton to apply pressure under Taylor's nose to force him tore-
lease the card from his mouth. 55 Once the card was recovered, the defen-
45. There is indeed some question as to whether this other detainee, Nelson Bryant, was even 
at the Craven County Jail. In an affidavit submitted by Taylor, Bryant testifies that he was, yet ac-
cording to the jail's records and the officers themselves, Bryant was not present at the altercation in 
dispute. See id. at 482. 
46. See id. at 481. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. !d. 
50. See id. at 481 n.5 (noting that Officer Lovick admitted in an internal investigation report 
that it was he, and not McDuffie, who used the baton on Taylor). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. ("Officer Lovick claimed that Taylor fought with him to prevent Lovick from get-
ting the license, grabbed the file blade from the counter, and threatened him."). 
53. See id. 
54. /d. at 481. 
55. See id. 
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dants removed the handcuffs and leg irons and placed Taylor in a holding 
cell. 56 
Nine hours after Taylor was released, he went to Craven Regional 
Medical Center to receive medical care for the injuries he sustained at the 
jail.57 Taylor's medical records show that he received "abrasions on his 
wrists and ankles, slight swelling in the jaw area, tenderness over some 
ribs, and some excoriation of the mucous membranes of the mouth. No 
scalp lesions, bone fractures, swelling in the tissue around the spinal col-
umn, cracked teeth, or injuries to his nose were found."58 
Nonetheless, Taylor filed an action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 alleg-
ing that Officer Lovick and Deputy McDuffie used excessive force 
against him while he awaited his initial appearance before the magis-
trate.59 Taylor sought compensatory and punitive damages totaling $20 
million.60 The district court found that the affidavits submitted by the de-
fendants supporting their version of the events, and opposing Taylor's 
allegations, carried the day.61 The district court analyzed Taylor's section 
1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment and granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity 
d 62 groun s. 
B. The Court's Reasoning 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit started its analysis of Taylor's section 
1983 excessive force claim by "identifying the specific constitutional 
right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force."63 The 
court acknowledged the fact that the district court analyzed Taylor's ex-
cessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, even though the 
Fourth Circuit had recently joined several circuits in holding that the 
"Fourth Amendment 'does not extend to the alleged mistreatment of ar-
restees or pretrial detainees in custody."'64 Instead, the court stated that 
"the excessive force claims of pretrial detainees are governed by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."65 According to the court, 
for Taylor to succeed on a claim of excessive force under the Due Proc-
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. /d. at 482. 
59. See id. at 480. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. /d. at 482 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). 
64. /d. at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 
1997)). 
65. /d. at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166)). 
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ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he must show that the defen-
dants "inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering."66 Further, 
the court stated that the applicable test is whether "the force applied was 
'in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. "'67 
Taylor conceded that the defendants were entitled to use force tore-
move Cabbagestalk's license from his mouth,68 so the real question for 
the court came down to whether or not the force was applied "mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" after Tay-
lor released the identification card.69 Since both parties have conflicting 
views on what happened at the Craven County Jail, the court relied on a 
combination of the district court's finding that Taylor's version of events 
was less credible than the accounting given by the defendants, and the 
fact that Taylor's medical report showed nothing more than de minimis 
injuries to find that the district court was justified in granting defendant's 
. f . d 70 motiOn or summary JU gment. 
In discussing to what degree the severity of Taylor's injuries related 
to his claim of excessive force, the court held that a failure to show more 
than a de minimis injury defeats an excessive force claim.71 The court re-
lied on its previous decision in Norman v. Taylor,72 which held that "ab-
sent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on 
an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injury is de mini-
mis." 73 The court continued, "[ e ]xtraordinary circumstances are present 
when 'the force used [is] of a sort repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind ... or the pain itself [is] such that it can properly be said to consti-
tute more than de minimis injury. "'74 While the language the court cites 
expressly applies to Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, the court 
acknowledges that the same standard is now applicable to excessive 
force claims brought by pretrial detainees such as Taylor under section 
1983.75 The court found that the injuries Taylor did receive, temporary 
irritation and swelling, were precisely the types of injuries that the Fourth 
Circuit considers de minimis. Further, the Court found that there were no 
66. !d. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). 
67. /d. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). 
68. See id. at 483. 
69. /d. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. 25 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
73. /d. at 1263. 
74. /d. at 1263 n.4. 
75. See Taylor, 155 F. 3d at 484 ("In Riley, we extended the holding of Norman to excessive 
force claims brought by pretrial detainees."). 
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"extraordinary circumstances" since the force that Lovick and McDuffie 
used was not the "sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind," nor was 
it the kind of force that produced more than de minimis pain. Thus, since 
Taylor could show no more than de minimis injury or extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the court held that his excessive force claim must fail, and 
that the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be affirmed.76 
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion,77 along with the Second,78 
Fifth,79 Seventh,80 Eighth,81 and Eleventh Circuits, 82 held that the sever-
ity of the injury sustained by the pretrial detainee is to be treated as only 
one among many factors in determining whether or not the force used by 
the officers was excessive. Additionally, the dissent points out that the 
medical records, which were heavily relied upon by the court, should not 
be weighted any heavier against the plaintiff than any other type of evi-
dence.83 This also accords with the circuits listed above. The dissent also 
indicates that there is an exception to the majority's "de minimis injury" 
rule: "even assuming for the sake of argument that Taylor's injuries were 
de minimis, we have previously held that the de minimis rule does not 
apply to conduct 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind .... "'84 Thus, 
the majority not only went against the weight of other circuit courts in 
holding de minimis injuries are conclusive of de minimis force, but also 
refused to categorize the treatment Taylor received as falling under the 
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind" exception that they endorsed. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
What the Fourth Circuit has done in Taylor v. McDuffie is illuminate 
two problems relating to the standard applicable to excessive force 
claims by pretrial detainees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. First, the Taylor 
court holds that the applicable standard for such claims is governed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.85 This holding is con-
sistent with the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' holdings.86 The 
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, along with the district court, have ana-
76. See id. at 480. 
77. See id. at 485. 
78. See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29 n.l (2d Cir. 1994). 
79. See Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996). 
80. See Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994). 
81. See White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 281 (8th Cir. 1994). 
82. See Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (lith Cir. 1996). 
83. See Taylor, 155 F.3d 487. 
84. /d. (quoting Norman, 25 F.3d at 1263 n.4). 
85. See id. at 483. 
86. See id. at 482-83. 
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lyzed such claims under the Fourth Amendment.87 Second, the Taylor 
court holds that a failure to show more than a de minimis injury will de-
feat an excessive force claim.88 The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits, along with the dissent in Taylor, have held that the se-
verity of the injury sustained by the pretrial detainee should be treated as 
only one among many factors in determining whether or not the force 
used by the officers was excessive.89 As stated previously, this note is 
concerned only with the severity of injury issue raised in the case. 
A. De Minimis Injury: One Factor or the Conclusive Factor? 
The Fourth Circuit has either misinterpreted or misunderstood the 
Supreme Court's decision in Hudson. The Norman court states: 
Finding ourselves in agreement with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that 
an excessive force claim generally should not lie where an injury sus-
tained by the plaintiff is de minimis,90 and that Hudson does not fore-
close and indeed is consistent with such a view,91 we hold that, absent 
the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an 
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injury is de minimis.92 
Hudson explicitly states that de minimis injury will only be one factor in 
a determination of excessive force claims,93 implying that there are other 
factors which are relevant to the discovery as well. Further, Hudson does 
not propose that the finding of only de minimis injury would foreclose 
the possibility of a finding that excessive force had been used.94 To the 
contrary, Hudson declares that an inmate or pretrial detainee could very 
well have suffered "malicious and sadistic" force with only de minimis 
injury since "[o]therwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any 
physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less 
than some arbitrary quantity of injury."95 
The de minimis injury inquiry is vital since it speaks to the larger is-
sue of determining whether or not the pretrial detainee or inmate was 
subjected to excessive force. The Norman court holds that the best evi-
dence for determining if a detainee has been subjected to more than de 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 483. 
89. See id. at 486. 
90. It is odd that the Norman court includes the Fifth Circuit here since the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion was actually reversed by Hudson. However, maybe this should not come as much of a sur-
prise since, as the Taylor dissent points out, the Norman court misinterprets the Hudson holding. 
91. See infra text accompanying note I 0 I. 
92. Norman, 25 F.3d at 1263. 
93. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 
94. See id. at 10. 
95. /d. at 9. 
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minimis force is to look to his or her injuries. If the detainee's injuries 
are de minimis, the court reasons, then it will follow that the force used 
to inflict those injuries was also de minimis.96 Is this really the standard 
that the Fourth Circuit wants its jurisdiction to promote? There are many 
methods, according to the dissent in Taylor, by which experienced offi-
cers can inflict great pain yet leave no readily evident trace of injury: 
[l]t is certainly not difficult to imagine circumstances where the exces-
sive use of force might result in no serious, visible injury to the plain-
tiff. For example, imagine an inmate who, although thrown from a 
prison balcony, is fortunate to incur only minor scrapes and bruises. Or 
imagine an inmate who, although beaten intensely in the stomach, back, 
chest, or groin, displays no greater outward signs of physical injury 
than that which [the Fourth Circuit] terms 'temporary swelling.' 97 
This is precisely why Hudson correctly laid out the rule that de minimis 
injuries should be but one factor in determining excessive force claims. 
Also, if the Fourth Circuit is going to focus on the extent of the 
plaintiff's injuries, the court should examine every aspect of those inju-
ries. As the dissent in Norman points out, the determination of the extent 
of the plaintiff's injury should also be comprised of the accompanying 
"pain, fear, and possible psychological damage."98 Nowhere in the Tay-
lor opinion does the court bring out the psychological effects or trauma 
that may have ensued as a result of the alleged beating. These factors are 
obviously difficult to pick up by the de minimis injury test since they are 
not likely to manifest themselves as external injuries, but are injuries 
nonetheless. 
Hudson's injuries were very similar to those suffered by Taylor, and 
the Supreme Court held that "the blows directed at Hudson, which 
caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are 
not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes."99 Also, Hudson held 
that an inmate or pretrial detainee could very well have suffered "mali-
cious and sadistic" force with only de minimis injury: "this is true 
whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth 
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how dia-
bolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of in-
jury."100 By holding that the extent of the inmate's injury will constitute 
only one factor in discovering whether excessive force has been used, the 
Hudson court has left an avenue for relief open to those victims of "dia-
96. See Norman, 25 F.3d at 1263. 
97. Taylor, 155 F. 3d at 486. 
98. Norman, 25 F.3d at 1265. 
99. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10. 
100. /d. at 9. 
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bolic or inhuman" acts that leave de minimis injuries. 
The Fourth Circuit tries to rectify this problem by providing a similar 
safety valve for those victims who do not meet the de minimis injury 
threshold. The Norman court points out that: 
We recognize that there may be highly unusual circumstances in which 
a particular application of force will cause relatively little, or perhaps 
no, enduring injury, but nonetheless will result in an impermissible in-
fliction of pain .... In these circumstances, we believe that either the 
force used will be 'of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' 
and thus expressly outside the de minimis force exception, or the pain 
itself will be such that it can properly be said to constitute more than de 
. . . . . 101 
m1mm1s InJury. 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit has left itself an exception to the strict "de 
minimis injury" standard that has been articulated in both Norman and 
Taylor. Yet if the inquiry stops at de minimis injury, the plaintiff will be 
able to exercise the exception only in the very rarest of circumstances 
when both he or she and the accused officers testify similarly regarding 
the heinous beating or use of excessive force. 
B. Surviving Summary Judgment and the Problem Medical Records 
Present as Evidence of De Minimis Injury. 
In Sanders-El v. Spielman, 102 a case decided after Taylor, an inmate 
at the Roxbury Correctional Institution, brought a section 1983 action 
against several correctional officers alleging that he was the victim of an 
assault. 103 The plaintiff claims that after he had an argument with an offi-
cer over what type of food he wanted for lunch, "Officer Spielman came 
up behind him, grabbed him by the handcuffs, slammed his face into a 
glass partition, threw him to the ground, and then kicked and stomped on 
him." 104 As a result of the alleged beating, the plaintiff "suffered bruises, 
a black eye, and continuing pain in his left elbow for at least thirty days 
after the incident." 105 Of course, as was the case in Taylor, the defendants 
painted an entirely different picture. The defendants alleged that the 
plaintiff kicked at an officer and, in an attempt to flee, started to run 
away. 106 As the plaintiff was running around a curve, according to the of-
101. Norman, 25 F.3d at 1264 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). 
I 02. 38 F.Supp. 2d 438 (D. Md. 1999). 
103. See id. at 438-39. 
104. /d. at 439. 
105. /d. 
106. See id. 
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ficers, he slipped and fell. According to the defendants, this was all that 
occurred. 107 
Even though the injuries sustained by Sanders-El were no worse than 
those suffered by Taylor, 108 the Sanders-El court was not convinced that 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment in that case should be 
granted on the basis that the plaintiffs injuries were only "de minimis" 
and thus an insufficient basis for the section 1983 excessive force 
claim. 109 Sanders-El had injuries similar to the injuries sustained by Tay-
lor (i.e., black eye, a swollen left elbow, and tenderness around his ribs, 
wrists and elbow), 110 yet the Sanders-El court did not stifle Sanders-El' s 
claim of excessive force by granting the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, as the Fourth Circuit had in Taylor. 111 Instead, the Sanders-El 
court determined that "[t]here clearly exists a genuine dispute of material 
fact on the issue of whether plaintiff was attacked and battered by the de-
fendants or was the victim of a slip and fall accident of his own mak-
ing."112 Taylor's claim did not similarly survive McDuffie's motion for 
summary judgment since his medical records did not show more than a 
de minimis in jury. 113 
The Sanders-El court calls into question the very reasoning of the 
Taylor court: "Taylor might be read as establishing the premise that if 
there is a discrepancy between a prisoner's description of his injuries and 
what is contained in the medical records, the contents of the records must 
b d f . d " 114 Th' . h e accepte as true or summary JU gment purposes. IS IS t e same 
problem that the dissent in Taylor addressed with the Fourth Circuit's 
reasoning. The fact that the Fourth Circuit weighs the medical records 
heavier than a prisoner's affidavit regarding his or her treatment as a 
prisoner or pretrial detainee is "suspect."115 According to the Sanders-El 
court, which agrees with the Taylor dissent, "medical records have no 
higher status than other evidence" in determining if a pretrial detainee 
has been subjected to excessive force. 116 
Also, the Sanders-El court addresses how the realities of working in 
a prison (or a county jail, or a processing center) setting may skew the 
107. See id. 
I 08. See id. at 439 (recognizing that "these injuries are not substantially more severe than 
those suffered by the plaintiff in Taylor"). 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
Ill. See id. 
112. /d. 
113. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
114. See Sanders-£/, 38 F.Supp. 2d at 439 n.l. 
115. /d. 
116. !d. 
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evidence in favor of those defending section 1983 excessive force ac-
tions. The court, in dicta, states: 
[I]t would seem that the law must entertain the possibility that health 
care providers in a prison setting might bring certain biases to their oc-
cupation, be they caused by continuous exposure to inmates who may 
overstate their maladies, the need to maintain good working relation-
ships with correctional officers, pressures exerted and felt within the 
chain of command, or, where medical services are being provided by a 
private contractor, a conscious or subconscious motive not to create 
problems that might result in nonrenewal of the contract. 117 
Thus, the Sanders-El court posits the likelihood that the reason a greater 
number of medical records do not show more than de minimis injuries is 
because those records are usually produced by the co-workers of the de-
fendant officers. Yet again, this is another problem that the Fourth Cir-
cuit could have avoided by adopting the correct Hudson position that de 
minimis injuries are only one factor in the excessive force determination. 
Pretrial detainees or inmates, usually proceeding pro se, also have a 
very difficult time producing "record evidence" on behalf of their 
cause.
118 Much of what the inmate or detainee can produce from his or 
her position of incarceration is in the form of affidavits from fellow in-
mates and detainees. Needless to say, there is almost always going to be 
diametrically opposed evidence produced by the accused officers and 
their victims. The Norman dissent points out that there are special prob-
lems in generating objective "record evidence" in an excessive force 
claim. 119 It is very difficult for an inmate or detainee to seek evidentiary 
assistance from outside specialists or physicians while in the custody of 
corrections or police officers. Also, as the Sanders-El dicta points out, 
prison physicians and other institutional employees are not above re-
proach. Considering all of this, an inmate's or detainee's affidavit and 
the affidavits from his or her fellow inmates "are about the best [ evi-
dence] that can be expected."120 
Nonetheless, pretrial detainees have the right, under the Eighth 
Amendment, not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment while 
in the custody of law enforcement officials. 121 Further, section 1983 al-
lows detainees or inmates to seek damages for the "deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" from those 
persons that deprive such rights under the color of authority of "any stat-
117. !d. 
118. See Nornwn, 25 F.3d at 1265. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. 
121. U.S. Const. amend VIII. 
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ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia."122 Such protections speak to the decency with 
which our society chooses to treat its prisoners and detainees since 
"when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause 
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated."123 
On the other hand, it is obvious that activities that constitute a "dep-
rivation of rights" or a "malicious and sadistic use of force to cause 
harm" are going to vary depending on who is being asked to define such 
terms. A pretrial detainee that is forcefully prohibited from smoking 
while in a detention center or holding cell is unquestioningly going to be-
lieve that he or she has been subjected to a deprivation of rights, and if 
the force is stiff enough, perhaps even a malicious use of force. Or per-
haps an officer, in an effort to maintain discipline over an unruly de-
tainee, believes that the force reasonable to accomplish his objective is 
several swings of the baton and a kick to the head. Instances such as 
these have provided courts with ample opportunity to draw the fine lines 
between state sponsored abuse and maintaining order and authority in the 
administration of public safety. 124 Thus, the extent of the victim's injury 
cannot and should not be the conclusive factor in a plaintiff's claim that 
he or she was subjected to excessive force that amounts to cruel and un-
usual punishment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a reason that the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to still 
hold that evidence of de minimis injury is conclusive evidence of de 
minimis force and thus no excessive force claim can stand. The reason is 
that the Fourth Circuit has misinterpreted and misapplied the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hudson. Judge Murnaghan, a member of the Fourth 
Circuit and the dissenting judge in Taylor, sums it up nicely: "I expect 
that soon the Supreme Court will place the Fourth Circuit back on the 
course intended by Hudson. Until that day, I fear for the injustice that 
awaits pretrial detainees in our nation's jails."125 
Troy J. Aramburu 
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